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  8.2.6 Risk

What is risk? In the following definition from Webster’s Dictionary risk is defined in terms of loss: “Exposure to the chance of injury or loss; a hazard or dangerous chance.” But, a more appropriate definition of risk for investors is “uncertainty of expected returns.” Most investors think of risk as some sort of loss. To the surprise of many investors, the potential for loss is also the reason they earn a return. “Loss aversion” refers to the concept that the pain of losing a sum of money is greater than the pleasure of gaining the same amount of money. This is incorporated into the optimization process that uses risk and return trade-offs of different asset classes to build portfolios. Research shows that investors are about twice as sensitive to investment losses as to gains.

Risk is most commonly measured in terms of standard deviation or the volatility around a given average. Prior to the groundbreaking Fama/French research, stock market risk was measured as volatility around the average return of the total stock market. However, Fama and French added two more dimensions to the measurement of investment risk — size and price.

Investors envision risk in several different ways. One way would be the worst case probability of a loss, such as the chance of not achieving an expected rate of return, not being able to readily obtain an expected amount of money at a specific time or the need to withdraw funds from investments when they are in a cumulative negative return position.

Risk is one of the most avoided, least quantified and misunderstood subjects by those working in the financial services industry. This is unfortunate because the primary purpose of investment professionals is the intelligent management of financial risks and the alignment of an investor’s risk capacity with the appropriate exposure to financial risk or uncertainty.

One dimension of Risk Capacity™ is an investor’s knowledge about risk, the more they understand it, the more capacity they have for risk. We face risk because nobody can consistently predict the future. After all, if we could see the future, there would be no risk. Wouldn’t it be nice to get next year’s Wall Street Journal today!

Risk, return, and time are all interconnected. Higher exposure to the right risk factors leads to higher expected returns. In accordance with the law of numbers, the longer an investor holds a broadly diversified risky investment, the more likely a long-term expected return will be obtained. However, because of random drift, risk is very unpredictable in the short run, yet more accurately quantifiable than gut feelings and intuition in the long run. Random drift can be illustrated by flipping a coin and obtaining 10 heads in a row. There is still a 50/50 chance of heads the next time and every time in the future.

Risk and Return Correlate Closely

Investment risk and return correlate closely and are tightly intertwined. The bottom line is that risk must be taken to achieve a return. Risk is the currency of return. A greater return can be considered a payment for investors subjecting themselves to greater uncertainty of those returns. Without the uncertainty of gain or loss, why would there be any logical reason for investors to earn money? This correlation is evident in virtually all stock market historical data. There are ways to refine risk and return, but at the end of the day, risk is the currency used to purchase returns.

With that clarification, the question then arises as to what denominations and values can be identified. In other words, what are the risk factors, and how are they priced? These questions were addressed by Eugene Fama and Kenneth French.

Systematic and Unsystematic Risk

When Nobel laureate William Sharpe published his Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in 1964, he decomposed a portfolio’s risk into systematic or nonspecific risk and nonsystematic or specific risk.

Systematic risk refers to the risks of the entire market as opposed to the risks specific to one stock. These market-wide risks are tied to large scale risks like the risk of capitalism being a viable economic social system. Other risks not specific to one stock include war, recession, inflation, and government policies.

Nonsystematic risk refers to those risks that are specific to individual companies. Examples include lawsuits, fraud, competition and other unique circumstances related to a company. The important fact for investors to understand is that there is no added expected return for nonsystematic risk above the expected return for systematic risk. This is a very big idea that essentially says that all stocks have an expected return that is the same as the market or a market index fund return. However, those stocks have more uncertainty of the expected return.

The incremental risk of one stock (nonsystematic risk) is unrewarded risk, and therefore should be avoided by investors. However, the systematic risk of capitalism is essentially the market risk and has earned an annualized return of about 10% per year for 80 years. But, in periods of less than 10 years, the annualized returns can be very volatile and uncertain. In periods longer than 20 years, the annualized returns of each period are far more consistent than one to five-year periods.

Concentration Risk

Individual stocks and bonds contain both systematic and nonsystematic risk. If investors hold the market portfolio of stocks like the Wilshire 5000, they have eliminated nonsystematic risk and they have not concentrated their portfolio on fewer stocks than the market. Concentration risk occurs when investors try to pick stocks and bonds that they think will outperform the market. Concentration of investments is akin to speculation and add risk, but provide no additional expected return.


Figure 8-10


 

Concentration risk comes from all active management strategies such as stocks, timers, managers or style picking. The opposite of concentration is diversification and therefore diversification is often referred to as the antidote to uncertainty. Figure 8-10 summarizes these concepts of riskese in a flow diagram. Figures 8-11 and 8-12 explain the reasons to avoid concentration risk.

Figure 8-11

Figure 8-11aa

Figure 8-11A

Figure 8-11B

Figure 8-11C

Figure 8-11D

Figure 8-11E

Figure 8-11E

See similar charts in Chapter 3 of PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS

Figure 8-12


Index Funds Reduce Uncertainty of Expected Returns
Portfolios of index funds shield investors from diversifiable risk better than portfolios of active funds. Yet no portfolio, whether active or index, can reduce the systematic risk or non-diversifiable risk that is inherent in all portfolios. This is the market risk that a person’s investments, however conservative, will decline in value because of a market downturn.



8.2.7 The Dimensions of Stock Return

Researchers did not have a very good idea about what sources of investment risk actually produced higher returns until 1992. They previously only had Sharpe’s One-Factor Model to explain how investment returns were derived as seen in Figure 8-13. However, Sharpe’s One-Factor Model explained only about 70% of the returns of the stock market.

Figure 8-13

In 1992, Eugene F. Fama of the University of Chicago and Kenneth R. French of Yale University developed a three-factor model to characterize and describe the relationship between risk and return for stocks. Their model is essentially an extension of Sharpe’s One-Factor Model. Sharpe said that the amount of a portfolio invested in stocks is the most important determinant of return. The Fama/French model added two other fundamental determinants. Fama and French sought to determine the factors that best describe why there are differences among the returns of stock asset classes over long periods of time. They first studied the period starting in 1964, the year that reliable computer data was available. It was later updated and confirmed with data dating back to 1926. In short, they tried to identify the factors that explained the remaining 30% of returns left unexplained by Sharpe.

Fama and French concluded that exposure to three risk factors — market, size, and price (book-to-market) — collectively do the best job pinpointing the sources of investment risk that account for stock market returns. Risk factors are sources of risk that the stock market seems to reward over the long run. Based on the Fama/French findings, these three risk factors constitute the dimensions of stock returns. To review the average annual returns for the last 81 years, see Figure 8-14.

Figure 8-14

These three risk factors combined explain up to 95% of the returns of the market in U.S. and foreign stock markets. These findings suggest that an investor’s investment performance in comparison to the stock market or other investors depends almost entirely on the percentage of stocks (market factor) held in a portfolio, and more specifically, the amount of small stocks (size factor) and high book-to-market ratio stocks (value factor) held.

Figure 8-15

Figure 8-15 illustrates the three dimensions of market, size, and value in 20 different index portfolios, as seen in Appendix A. Each colored circle represents one index portfolio, with the red button representing the highest exposure to market, small size stocks and value stocks.

Market Risk Factor

The first risk factor in the Fama/French Three-Factor Model is the amount of exposure to the overall stock market or the market risk factor. Exposure to this factor is determined by the amount of a portfolio that’s invested in or exposed to stocks. The greater this exposure, the higher the return in comparison to U.S. Treasury bills.

Size Risk Factor

The second risk factor in the Fama/French model is the amount of exposure to small company stocks or the size risk factor. Exposure to this factor is determined by the amount of a portfolio that is invested in small company stocks. The greater this exposure, the higher the return in comparison to large company stocks.

Small company stocks have small market capitalization. The market cap is determined by multiplying the total number of shares times the price per share. These stocks are generally perceived as riskier than large company stocks because small companies have fewer financial resources and more uncertain earnings than large companies. Small companies are also less able to survive prolonged periods of economic downturns. Even when small companies have good track records, these track records aren’t very long, adding more uncertainty and greater risk to their stocks. Because investing in small company stocks is riskier, investors demand a higher rate of return.

It’s important to understand that the average return of small-cap company stocks have significantly outperformed large company stocks over the last 80 years by 3.13% per year. But, to get higher returns, investors must accept a step up in the uncertainty of those returns. Figure 8-16 plots the deciles (one-tenth buckets) of U.S. companies sorted by size over the last 81 years. Note that a fairly clear line exists between the less risky large-cap stocks in decile 1 and the very risky microcap stocks in decile 10.

Figure 8-16

However, in shorter time periods they don’t always outperform large company stocks. In fact, the size risk factor fluctuates unpredictably. This is consistent with the Random Walk Theory of changes in stock prices.

Price (Value) Risk Factor

The third risk factor in the Fama/French model is the amount of exposure to low priced stocks, which is measured by a book-to-market (BtM) value ratio. The book value of a company is just an accounting term for its net worth, its assets minus its liabilities. The market value of a company is its price per share times the number of shares outstanding. This risk factor is known by several different designations. It has been referred to as the value factor, BtM factor, style factor and price factor. Note that charts referring to it may have any of these designations. The most current designation is the price factor, referring to the low prices of these stocks compared to a company’s book value or to other stocks.

Exposure to the price factor is determined by the amount of a portfolio exposure to high BtM stocks. In other words, when a stock’s market price is less than its book value, the BtM ratio is greater than one. The greater the exposure to the price factor, the higher the historic and expected return in comparison to low BtM stocks. High BtM companies usually have low earnings and experience other signs of financial distress. Investors don’t like these stocks for these reasons. As a result of their poor track records, the market drives down the prices of these stocks. This naturally makes them riskier to investors.

Stocks with a low BtM ratio have low book values relative to their market prices and are termed growth stocks. Investors favor growth stocks because they’re perceived to be great companies and therefore are less risky. They represent successful companies with strong track records and healthy earnings.

The Nobel Prize-winning contribution made by Merton Miller provides a framework for better understanding the connection between the price risk factor and stock returns. Miller set forth a simple but profound notion: the cost of capital to a company equals the expected return to an investor who holds its stock. A company’s cost of capital is equal to the price or book value of its shares or the amount that a company must pay in order to obtain capital from investors.The Figure below proves out Miller’s Nobel-prize winning research. The figure plots the 80-year risk and return characteristics for the entire U.S. stock market as divided by book-to-market ratios in 5 quintiles. As you can clearly see, the low-book-to-market companies (numbers 1 and 2) produced negligible returns that came with very low risk. The 20% of all U.S. companies with the highest book-to-market (number 5) were perceived to be in the greatest distress, and consequently paid a higher cost of capital (return) to their investors.

Figure 8-16a

For example, suppose that a value company and a growth company each approach a bank for a loan. Which company will have to pay the higher cost of capital (the higher interest rate) on its loan? The value company will pay the higher cost because its future is less certain and the bank will need to charge extra interest for taking the extra risk that the company won’t be able to pay back its loan. Thus, the riskier the company’s stock, the higher the cost of capital paid by a company.

Because the market perceives a value stock to be riskier, it drives down their price so that the expected return is high enough to make it worthwhile for investors to hold, despite the extra risk they take when buying it. In this way, stock prices adjust, (the market sets the price at a discount, so its expected return is higher) to reflect the perceived riskiness of the stock. This ensures that the stock will be purchased, even though growth companies have better earnings prospects and generally seem safer.

The key to understanding the connection between the price risk factor and stock returns lies in focusing on the market price of a stock. A high BtM ratio suggests that the market values the stock less than the stock’s accountants. This is usually because the stock has poor earnings as well as other indications of financial distress. This makes the stock riskier. As a result, investors demand a higher rate of return to compensate them for the risk that a high BtM stock will do worse than expected, go bankrupt, and end up as one of the “stocks in a box.”

A 1987 study compared the investment performance of a portfolio of 29 growth stocks to one with 29 value stocks. The growth stocks represented companies that were stronger and healthier than value stocks by every economic measure, including return on total capital, return on equity, and return on sales. The value stocks represented companies that had little profitability, terrible management, and a bad image. Yet, the study found that the value stocks outperformed the growth stocks, 298% to 182%, over the five-year period of 1981 to 1985.

This means that investors earned higher returns by owning the stocks of companies that did poorly. That seems counterintuitive to most investors, since they tend to think that healthy stocks are better investments than distressed stocks. After all, if investors ask for a stock tip, they want to hear the name of the next Microsoft, not a stock with poor earnings. The fact is that investors should be interested in great investments (value stocks), not great companies (growth stocks).

Figure 8-17


Figure 8-17 illustrates the relationship between expected return and the three factors of market, size, and value. Since we are only discussing stocks, the market exposure is not shown on this plot. The higher the investment plots in the top right quadrant, the higher the expected return. The full page Figure 8-18 actually puts values of average expected returns of various indexes over the market return. The blue circles on the plot represent various indexes. The total market index is plotted at the center of the cross hatch, which is a 0,0 on the scale of size and value. The return in the top right corner is the highest return on the plot. The dotted diagonal line represents indexes that would have the same return as the market return. Also note that large growth stocks have negative average returns relative to the total market return, with the bottom left corner value being -4.71%. Large and safe companies have lower risk associated with them and therefore have lower returns compared to smaller companies. Note that a portfolio similar to Index Portfolio 90 (see Appendix A) plots with an expected average return of about 3% over the total market return. Because Index Portfolio 90 has international indexes in the mix, this is not entirely accurate, but it does give us an idea of how this type of analysis works.


Figure 8-18
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